In 1,2] we introduced the notion of di erential cryptanalysis and described its application to DES 11] and several of its variants. In this paper we show the applicability of di erential cryptanalysis to the Feal family of encryption algorithms and to the N-Hash hash function. In addition, we show how to transform di erential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attacks into known plaintext attacks.
Introduction
Feal is a family of encryption algorithms, which are designed to have simple and e cient software implementations on eight-bit microprocessors. The original member of this family, called Feal- 4 13] , had four rounds. This version was broken by Den Boer 3] using a chosen plaintext attack with 100 to 10000 ciphertexts.
The designers of Feal reacted by creating a second version, called Feal- 8 12,9] in which the number of rounds was increased to eight, while the F function was not changed.
Feal-8 was broken by the di erential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attack described in this paper. As a result, two new versions were added to the family: Feal-N 6] with any even number N of rounds, and Feal- NX 7] with an extended 128-bit key. In addition, The designers proposed a more complex eight-round version called N-Hash 8] as a cryptographically strong hash function which maps arbitrarily long inputs into 128-bit values.
Recently, two chosen plaintext attacks on Feal were published. The one analyses Feal-8 using 10000 encryptions 5]. This attack is partially derived from the attack described in this paper. The other analyses Feal-4 using 20 encryptions 10].
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The main results reported in this paper are as follows: Feal-8 is breakable under a chosen plaintext attack with 2000 ciphertexts. Feal-N can be broken faster than via exhaustive search for any N 31 rounds, and Feal-NX is just as easy to break as Feal-N for any value of N. The di erential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attacks can be transformed into known plaintext attacks which can be applied even in the CBC mode of operation, provided we have su ciently many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (about 2 38 in the case of . Variants of N-Hash with up to 12 rounds can be broken faster than via the birthday paradox, but for technical reasons we can apply this attack only when the number of rounds is divisible by three. Feal-4 is trivially breakable with eight chosen plaintexts or via a non-di erential attack with about 100000 known plaintexts.
Di erential Cryptanalysis of Feal
The notion of di erential cryptanalysis and its application to DES-like cryptosystems are described in 1, 2] . The basic tool of di erential cryptanalytic attacks is a pair of ciphertexts whose corresponding plaintexts have a particular di erence. The method analyses many pairs with the same di erence, assigns probabilities to the di erent possible keys and locates the most probable key. For Feal the di erence is chosen as a particular XORed value of the two plaintexts.
In this paper we use the notation introduced in 1,2] with additional Feal-speci c notation: n x : An hexadecimal number is denoted by a subscript x (i.e., 10 x = 16). X , X 0 : At any intermediate point during the encryption of pairs of messages, X and X are the corresponding intermediate values of the two executions of the algorithm, and X 0 is de ned to be X 0 = X X . P, T: The plaintext and the ciphertext. Unlike in DES, they denote the real plaintext and ciphertext without ignoring the initial and nal transformations. Thus, the characteristic's input XOR P is di erent from the corresponding plaintext XOR P 0 . Note that the de nitions in 1,2] assume that P denotes the value after the initial transformation rather than the real plaintext. Figure 1 . The outline of Feal-8 and the F function.
ROLn(X), RORn(X): Rotation of the byte X by n bits to the left and to the right respectively. S i (x; y): The Feal S boxes: S i (x; y) = ROL2(x + y + i (mod 256)). : The exclusive-or operator.
The structure of Feal (see gure 1) is similar to the structure of DES with a new F function and modi ed initial and nal transformations. The F function of Feal contains two new operations: byte rotation which is XOR-linear and byte addition which is not XOR-linear. The byte addition operation is the only non-linear operation in Feal and therefore the strength of Feal crucially depends on its non-linearity. At the beginning and at the end of the encryption process the right half of the data is XORed with the left half of the data and the whole data is XORed with additional subkeys, rather than permuted as in DES. Due to their linearity, these XORs pose only minor di culty to our attack.
The addition operations in the S boxes are not XOR-linear. However, there is still a statistical relationship between the input XORs of pairs and their output XORs .  A table which shows the distribution of the input XORs and the output XORs of an  S box is called the pairs XOR distribution table of the S box. Such a table has an entry for each combination of input XOR and output XOR, and the value of an entry is the number of possible pairs with the corresponding input XOR and output XOR. Usually several output XORs are possible for each input XOR. A special case arises when the input XOR is zero, in which case the output XOR must be zero as well. We say that X may cause Y (denoted by X ! Y ) if there is a pair in which the input XOR is X and the output XOR is Y . We say that X may cause Y with probability p if for a fraction p of the pairs with input XOR X, the output XOR is Y .
Since each S box has 16 input bits and only eight output bits it is not recommended to use the pairs XOR distribution tables directly. Instead, in the rst stage of the analysis we use the joint distribution table of the two middle S boxes in the F function (inside the gray rectangle in gure 1). This combination has 16 input bits and 16 output bits, and the table has many interesting entries. For example, there are two entries with probability 1 which are 00 00 x ! 00 00 x and 80 80 x ! 00 02 x . About 98% of the entries are impossible (contain value 0). The average value of all the entries is 1, but the average value of the possible entries is about 50. In appendix A we #X is the number of bits set to 1 in the lower seven bits of the byte X and j is the or operator. This happens because each bit which is di erent in the pairs (X and X , or Y and Y ) gives rise to a di erent carry with probability close to 1 2 . If all the carries happen at the same bits in the pair then the equation is satis ed.
The input of the F function in the last round is a function of the ciphertext XORed with an additional subkey of the nal transformation rather than just a function of the ciphertext (as in DES). There is an equivalent description of Feal in which the XOR with the subkeys in the nal transformation is eliminated and the 16-bit subkeys XORed to the two middle bytes of the inputs of the F function in the various rounds are replaced by 32-bit values.
De nition 1 The 32-bit subkeys of the equivalent description in which the XOR with the subkeys in the nal transformation is eliminated are called actual subkeys. The actual subkey which replaces the subkey Ki is denoted by AKi. The actual subkeys of the nal transformation are eliminated and thus their equivalent values are zero. Our attack nds the actual subkeys rather than the subkeys themselves since it nds XORs of the ciphertexts and internal values in the F function. A tool which pushes the knowledge of the XORs of pairs as many rounds as possible is called a characteristic. An n-round characteristic starts with an input XOR value P and assigns a probability in which the data XOR after n rounds becomes T . Two characteristics The following is a ve-round characteristic with probability This ve-round characteristic can be extended to a six-round characteristic with probability 1 128 , for which not all the bit di erences at the left half of the data after which has a similar extension to six rounds.
Among the most useful characteristics are those that can be iterated. A characteristic is called an iterative characteristic if the swapped value of the two halves of P equals T . The iterative characteristics of Feal do not include one in which a non-zero input XOR of the F function may cause a zero output XOR since the F function is reversible, but there are other kinds of iterative characteristics. The 8 following is an iterative characteristic which has probability 1 4 for each round: Given a su ciently long characteristic and a right pair we can calculate the output XOR of F function in the last round. The inputs themselves of this F function are known from the ciphertexts up to a XOR with subkeys. For any possible value of the last actual subkey, we count the number of possible pairs for which the output XOR is as expected. Every right pair suggests the right value of the actual subkey. The wrong pairs suggest random values. Since the right pairs occur with the characteristic's probability, the right value of the actual subkey should be counted more often than any other value. Therefore, it can be identi ed.
The number of pairs needed for a di erential cryptanalytic attack depends on the characteristic's probability, on the number of subkey bits counted and on the level of identi cation of the right key. The ratio between the number of right pairs and the average count in a counting scheme is called the signal to noise ratio of the counting scheme and is denoted by S=N. The signal to noise ratio of a counting scheme is S=N = 2 k p where k is the number of subkey bits which are counted in 2 k counters, p is the characteristic's probability, is the average count per counted pair and is the 9 fraction of the counted pairs among all the pairs. The value of the signal to noise ratio indicates how many right pairs are needed to the attack and thus the total number of pairs needed. If the signal to noise ratio of a counting scheme is high only few pairs are needed. If the signal to noise ratio is low many right pairs are needed. If the signal to noise ratio is too low the attack may become impractical.
Cryptanalysis of Feal-8
This di erential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attack on Feal-8 uses about 1000 pairs of ciphertexts whose corresponding plaintexts are chosen at random satisfying P 0 = A2 00 80 00 22 80 80 00 x . This plaintext XOR is motivated by the following six-round characteristic whose probability is 1=128, for which not all the bits of T are xed: where the values of X, Y , Z and W can range (for di erent right pairs) over X 2 f5; 6; 7; 9; A; B; D; E; Fg, Y 2 f9; A; Bg, Z 2 f0; 1; 3g and W = X 8.
Five shorter characteristics are derived from the rst rounds of this six-round characteristic. Each characteristic has a di erent number of rounds but all of them have the same value of P . The one-round characteristic which is derived from the rst round of the six-round characteristic has probability 1. The two-round characteristic which is derived from the rst two rounds has probability 1=4. The three-round characteristic also has probability 1=4. The four-round and the ve-round characteristics have probability 1=16.
Reducing Feal-8 to seven rounds
In order to nd the last actual subkey we do the following. Given the ciphertexts T and T of a right pair, we can deduce: of the wrong pairs are discarded by this veri cation. We can also discard about 4 5 of the other wrong pairs for which g 0 of the wrong pairs should pass the three lters. Since the right pairs occur with the characteristic's probability of 1 128 , most of the remaining pairs are right pairs. The counting scheme counts the number of pairs for which each value of the 16-bit last actual subkey mx(AK7) is possible. This ratio is so high that only eight right pairs are typically needed for the attack, and thus the total number of pairs we have to examine is about 8 128 1000. Note that we cannot distinguish between the right value of the 16-bit actual subkey and the same value XORed with 80 80 x . Therefore, we nd two possibilities for the 16-bit last actual subkey.
The following counting scheme is used to complete the last actual subkey. For this counting scheme the ve-round characteristic with probability 1=16 su ces. For each pair (out of all the pairs) we calculateĤ andĤ and getĤ 0 where for any 32-bit X,X is the 16-bit value of its two middle bytes (i.e., (X 1 ; X 2 )). Then we calculatê g 0 =l 0 Ĥ 0 ,F 0 =ê 0 ĝ 0 and few other bits of g 0 and discard any pair for which we can conclude that g 0 6 ! G 0 by the F function using the bits we have found. We count the number of the pairs satisfying this condition. The value of AK7 0 which is counted most often is likely to be the right value. We cannot distinguish the upper bit of the value, so we try just 128 possibilities (instead of 256 as was expected) and then try the two possible values in the following steps, till the wrong one fails. In a similar way we nd seven bits of AK7 3 . As a result, we nd eight possibilities for AK7 and we can reduce the cryptosystem to a seven-round cryptosystem.
Reducing the seven-round cryptosystem to six rounds
We assume that the last actual subkey is already known, so the cryptosystem can be reduced to a seven-round cryptosystem. A right pair with respect to the ve-round characteristic with probability 1=16 satis es f 0 = A2 00 80 00 x g 0 = l 0 H 0 G 0 = h 0 f 0 = h 0 A2 00 80 00 x F 0 = e 0 g 0 = l 0 H 0 80 80 00 00 x :
We verify that f 0 ! F 0 and g 0 ! G 0 and count in two steps: the rst step counts on the 16-bit actual subkey and the second step counts on each one of the other two bytes. The signal to noise ratio of the rst step which nds the 16-bit actual subkey mx(AK6 In the rst step one bit is indistinguishable and in the second step two bits are indistinguishable. Therefore, we try all the eight possibilities of AK6 in parallel in the following steps.
In total we nd at most 64 possibilities for the last two actual subkeys and can thus reduce the cryptosystem to six rounds. In this step we can always distinguish all the bits using less than 1000 pairs. Given AK5 we reduce the cryptosystem to ve rounds and nd AK4 using the three-round characteristic. For each possible value of AK4 we count the number of 
Although we nd seven actual subkeys with the (true) assumption that many actual subkeys have the same values in their rst bytes, and the same values in their last bytes, it is possible to extend this attack to the general case where all the actual subkeys are independent (i.e., 8 32 + 2 32 = 320 independent bits).
Calculating the key itself
Using the values of the actual subkeys AK1{AK7 the following XORs of the original subkeys can be obtained:
K5 K7 K4 K6 K3 K5 K2 K4 K1 K3:
We can easily derive the key itself by analyzing the structure of the key processing algorithm using these values. Given the key, we verify that it is really processed to the known actual subkeys and that the XOR of a decrypted pair of ciphertexts equals the chosen plaintext XOR value. If this veri cation succeeds then the calculated key is very likely to be the real key.
Results
This attack was implemented on a COMPAQ personal computer. It nds the key in less than two minutes using 1000 pairs with more than 95% success rate. Using quartets with two characteristics we need 1000 ciphertexts for this attack. Using 2000 pairs it nds the key with almost 100% success rate. The program uses 280K bytes of memory. The probability of each round of this characteristic is 1=4, and it can be concatenated to itself any number of times since the swapped value of the two halves of P equals T . Thus, for any arbitrary n, an n-round characteristic with probability 1 4 n = 2 ?2n can be obtained.
An attack based on a characteristic which is shorter by two rounds than the cryptosystem is called a 2R-attack. In this case, we know the ciphertext XOR T 0 and the input XOR of the last round (w.l.g. we employ the notation of an eightround cryptosystem) h 0 by the ciphertext, and f 0 and g 0 by the characteristic. Thus, G 0 = f 0 h 0 and H 0 = g 0 l 0 . Each pair is veri ed to have g 0 ! G 0 and h 0 ! H 0 16 and the resultant pairs are used in the process of counting the possibilities in order to nd the last actual subkey. Two bits of the last actual subkey are indistinguishable. Therefore, we must try the following steps in parallel for the four possibilities of these two bits. wrong pairs for each right pair. Therefore, the right value of the last subkey is counted with a detectably higher probability than a random value up to N 28 rounds, and thus we can break Feal-N with 2R-attacks for any N 28 rounds, faster than via exhaustive search, as shown in table 1.
An attack based on a characteristic which is shorter by one round than the cryptosystem is called a 1R-attack. Using 1R-attacks (w.l.g. we employ the notation of an eight-round cryptosystem), we know T 0 and h 0 from the ciphertext and g 0 and h 0 from the characteristic. Also, H 0 = g 0 l 0 . We can verify that h 0 calculated by the wrong pairs for each right pair. Therefore, the right value of the last subkey is counted with detectably higher probability than a random value up to N 31 rounds. A summary of the 1R-attacks on Feal-N appears in table 1, and shows that the di erential cryptanalysis is faster than exhaustive search up to N 31. Note that in both the 1R-attacks and the 2R-attacks we use octets (structures of eight encryptions) with four characteristics (this is a special case in which an octet can have four characteristics since The known plaintext attack is not limited to the electronic code book (ECB) mode of operation. In particular, the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode can also be broken by this attack since when the plaintexts and the ciphertexts are known, it is easy to calculate the real input of the encryption function. Table 2 summarizes the di erential cryptanalytic known plaintext attacks on Feal and DES. For each of the listed cryptosystems with the listed number of rounds, the table describes the number of pairs of each characteristic and the total number of random plaintexts needed for the chosen plaintext attack and for the known plaintext attack. Breaking a cryptographically strong hash function means nding two di erent messages which hash to the same value. In particular, we break N-Hash by nding two di erent 128-bit messages which are hashed to the same 128-bit value. Since the output of the g-function is XORed with its input in order to form the hashed value, it su ces to nd a right pair for a characteristic of the g-function in which P = T . After XORing the input with the output of the g-function, the hashed value XOR becomes zero and thus the two messages have the same hashed value.
The following characteristic is a three-round iterative characteristic with probability 2 ?16 (N-Hash does not swap the two halves after each round since the swap operation is part of the round itself. Therefore, the concatenation of the characteristic In the description of this characteristic we refer to the value 80 60 80 00 x as and to the value 80 E0 80 00 x as '. Note that both ! ( ') and ' ! ( ') with probability 1 4 by the F function. The behavior of the XORs in the F function in this characteristic is similar to their behavior in the iterative characteristic of Feal. The characteristic itself is based on the input XOR: P = ( ; ; 0; 0): With probability 1 256 the data XOR after the rst round is (0; 0; '; '): With probability 1 256 the data XOR after the second round is ( ; ; '; '): Table 3 . Results of the attack on N-Hash.
The data after the third round is always T = P = ( ; ; 0; 0): Therefore, the probability of the characteristic is 2 ?16 .
A pair of messages whose XOR equals P has probability (2 ?16 ) 2 = 2 ?32 to have T as its output XOR after the sixth round of the g-function, and thus to have the same hashed value after their inputs and outputs are XORed by the six-round variant of N-Hash. Instead of trying about 2 32 random pairs of messages we can choose only pairs from a smaller set in which the characteristic is guaranteed to be satis ed in the four F functions of the rst round. The pairs in this set are chosen by the following algorithm. For each F function in the rst round we search a priori a list of input pairs for which the input XOR and the output XOR are as expected by the characteristic. To get a new pair we choose a random input pair for each F function and from the four input pairs and their corresponding outputs we deduce the two messages backwards. Therefore, the probability in this set is increased by a factor of 256, and only about 2 24 such pairs have to be tested in order to nd a pair of messages which hash to the same value.
This speci c attack works only for variants of N-Hash whose number of rounds is divisible by three. Table 3 describes the results of this attack. We can see from the table that this attack is faster than the birthday attack (whose complexity is 2 64 ) for variants of N-Hash with up to 12 rounds.
The attack on N-Hash with six rounds was implemented on a personal computer and the following pairs of messages (as well as many others) were found within about two hours: { CAECE595 127ABF3C 1ADE09C8 1F9AD8C2 { 4A8C6595 921A3F3C 1ADE09C8 1F9AD8C2 { Common hash value: 12B931A6 399776B7 640B9289 36C2EF1D { 5878BE49 F2962D67 30661E17 0C38F35E { D8183E49 72F6AD67 30661E17 0C38F35E { Common hash value: 29B0FE97 3D179E0E 5B147598 137D28CF.
7 Cryptanalysis of Feal-4
Feal-4 is breakable by a chosen plaintext attack which uses eight ciphertexts and the plaintext of one of them. We keep the notation used in the attack on Feal-8. Note that the attack described here really breaks an extension of Feal-4 whose all subkeys are 32-bit long.
We use the following two-round characteristic with probability 1 (for which P 0 = 80 80 00 00 80 80 00 00 The last actual subkey of this cryptosystem is AK3. Given the value of AK3 the value of D can be calculated for any ciphertext. For each possible value of AK3 we count the number of pairs for which D 0 calculated above from the characteristic equals D 0 calculated using AK3 and for which c 0 ! C 0 . The value of AK3 which is counted by all the pairs must be the right value. There is only a small probability that more than one such value is counted by all the pairs using four pairs. This counting can be done with complexity 2 16 by counting the possible values of mx(AK3), comparing D 0 and then counting the values of AK3 whose mx(AK3) is as found in the rst step.
Given AK3 we can reduce the cryptosystem to three rounds. For each possible value of AK2 we count the number of pairs whose values of C 0 from both directions are equal using another characteristic. The value which is counted by all the pairs is the real value of AK2. Similarly we nd AK1 and AK0 using other characteristics. The value of the actual subkey used in the initial transformation is easily found using the given plaintext.
In the search for AK2 we use a one-round characteristic with probability 1 which cannot be extended to two rounds with probability 1, since otherwise the input XOR of the third round would be constant for all the pairs. In the search for AK1 and AK0 we use pairs with random plaintext XORs. All the plaintext XORs needed can be obtained by a structure of eight encryptions.
A Known Plaintext Attack on Feal-4
This known plaintext attack is based on the property of the addition operation that there is a xed pattern of carry bits which is generated when many pairs of eight-bit numbers are added together. This carry type depends on the additional constant which is added to the sum. A similar attack is applicable to Feal-5.
De nition 2
Let X and Y be eight-bit variables and let i be an eight-bit constant. The carry type of the sum X + Y + i is de ned to be (X + Y + i (mod 256)) (X Y i). The carry type of the sum X + Y is an abbreviation of the carry type of the sum X + Y + 0.
Note that the carry types always end with a zero.
The following lemma derives the main properties of carry types:
Lemma If X j = Y j = 1 there is a carry from bit j to bit j + 1. Therefore, for each bit, in three out of four cases there is no carry and the total fraction is ( Y j = 1. If X j = Y j = 0 there is no carry from bit j to bit j + 1. Therefore, for each bit, in three out of four cases there is a carry and the total fraction is ( K C is a constant depending on the key only. E C can be calculated for every plaintext/ciphertext pair. The probability that E C = K C for a plaintext/ciphertext pair is greater than 1=256, since the probability we calculated is added to the probability of random occurrence. In addition, other carry phenomena cancel each other and increase the probability of this case. It is possible to prove the following:
The probability of E C = K C in a random plaintext/ciphertext pair is about 1=220. Given about 100000 plaintext/ciphertext pairs we can count the number of occurrences of each possible value of E C and with a high probability the most frequent value is the value of K C .
The value of K C does not provide any practical knowledge about the key. However, using K C we can lter the data leaving only those encryptions satisfying E C = K C . This ltration enrich the fraction of the plaintext/ciphertext pairs which have a zero carry type at the corresponding S boxes. If the carry type is zero in the S box outputting D 1 : 5 . The value that occurs most often is likely to be the real value. One bit is indistinguishable and for the others we need much more data than in the caes of K C . However, the XOR of these two values is usually the right value of their XOR.
Using those pairs we know D 1 (assuming the carry type is FE x ) and can assume a zero carry type in D 0 = S 0 (d 0 ; D 1 ) to nd more key bits. Similar calculations can then nd all the bits of the last actual subkey. The other actual subkeys can be found with much better identi cation after the reduction to a smaller number of rounds.
The attacking program nds the actual subkeys in less than two minutes on a personal computer using 100000 known plaintexts/ciphertext pairs. The program uses 250K bytes of memory. where for any 32-bit X,X is the 16-bit value of its two middle bytes (i.e., (X 1 ; X 2 )). The encryption and decryption using the new values of the subkeys give the same results as with the original values. Another equivalent description of the subkeys is denoted by the actual subkeys in which the subkeys of the rounds are extended to 32 bits and the subkey of the nal transformation is eliminated. Table 4 generalizes this observation for all the combinations of X 0 j , Y 0 j and C 0 j . The entries marked by are particularly useful because they can be used to identify wrong pairs. The entries marked by y can be used to derive the values of the bits X 0 and Y 0 . The entries marked by z can be used to derive the value of X j Y j and the value of Z 2 (W 0 ). The F function contains four S boxes. Some input bytes are used as inputs to two S boxes and the output bytes of some S boxes are used as inputs to other S boxes. By combining the knowledge obtained from the four S boxes we can nd contradictions on the values of bits, or calculate by one S box the value of bits needed in another S box.
